A study on the “reliance of municipal fire departments for confined space response” has been funded by a legal settlement following the deaths of two workers in a confined space incident in California.Research by the University of California, Berkeley, indicates that employers may be relying too heavily on local fire departments for confined space rescue.

These findings indicate that local fire departments may not have the resources to provide the specialized training needed for confined space rescue, especially when "response and rescue" times are such critical factors.

Key Points from Study

•  Confined space incidents represent a small but continuing source of fatal occupational injuries;

•  A sizeable portion of employers may be relying on public fire departments for permit-required confined space response; and,

•  With life-threatening emergencies, fire departments usually are not able to effect a confined space rescue in a timely manner.

Municipal Response Statistics

The study includes some very interesting statistics about fire department response times, rescue times, and capabilities. It also shows that rescue times increase dramatically when hazardous materials are present. For example, according to the report, fire department confined space rescue time estimates ranged from 48 to 123 min and increased to 70 and 173 min when hazardous materials were present.

According to the report, “estimates made by fire officers show that a worker who experiences cardiac arrest, deprivation of cerebral oxygen, or some other highly time-critical, life-threatening emergency during a confined space entry will almost certainly die if the employer’s emergency response plan relies solely on the fire department for rescue services.”

Researchers proposed that a more appropriate role for fire departments would be to support a properly trained and equipped on-site rescue team and to provide life support following a rescue.

Information excerpted from, “Confined Space Emergency Response: Assessing Employer and Fire Department Practices,” by Michael P. Wilson, Heather N. Madison & Stephen B. Healy (2012). This study was published in the Journal of Occupational and Environmental Hygiene (Feb 2012) and is available for purchase from Taylor & Francis Online.

In this and upcoming articles, we want to give you an idea of the actual forces that are put on M/A systems versus theoretical forces that you may read about. What’s the difference?

With theoretical, we’re referring to the amount of force that is “supposed” to be produced, while the actual is just that…the actual amount of force that is produced when the system is built and operated.

For example, calculating the force if you built  a 3:1 mechanical advantage “on paper” (theoretically) versus physically building the system. With the actual system, you would have to consider the friction loss created by the system components, so the “actual M/A” may be 2.5:1 with the same 3:1 system.

We decided to do some informal testing out at the Roco Training Center with the assistance of some of our students. The systems were tested as they are generally used in the field. The numbers shown are an average of the tests we conducted. The average is from a random sample of 10 to 20 tests using the same equipment and set up. We used a Dillon 25,000 lbf dynamometer with an error factor of +/-20 lbf. Note: These test numbers are designed as a reference only and should not be used as exact force data.

Test #1: Straight-line Pull

Student Set-up: Students were asked to pull on the line in a horizontal plane and exhibit as much force as they could without tugging/jerking the line. They were then asked to maintain that tension and tug/jerk the line.

Equipment Set-up: 12-ft of 1⁄2” PMI rope tied with a Figure 8 knot and attached to the dynamometer by two 2-ft pieces of 1” basket-looped webbing and two auto-locking steel carabiners to a rigid anchor with another basket-looped webbing loop.

What the Numbers Mean

First of all, they will serve as a baseline for future informal tests when comparing different types of M/A systems. We will evaluate the efficiency of the different systems as well as the possible forces that are put on the components of the system when using typical rescue haul teams.

Grasping at Ropes

One interesting fact that we can take away from these numbers is that even though the vast majority of the persons involved in the testing (random rescue students) weighedin excess of 160 lbs, they were only able to generate a maximum of 160 pounds of force on the 1⁄2-inch rope. This is largely due to the student’s ability to grasp and hold onto the 1⁄2” line before it pulled through their hands.

Similar tests using 9mm rope had an average force of 120 lbf for a single-person pull. There was only a slight difference of about 2 lbf between the 1⁄2-inch rope and the 9mm rope. We had anticipated a greater disparity as the rope diameter decreased and the ability to grasp the smaller line was lessened. However, we did observe that with the smaller diameter rope, haulers had a tendency to twist their hands making a 90-degree turn in the rope. This added additional friction making it possible to put more force on the line before it slipped.

Stay tuned as we continue this informal, real-world testing in future blog posts. It should be interesting to see how the forces translate from 1,2,3, and 4-person Haul Teams when using these various Mechanical Advantage systems.

QUESTION: What is required for making multiple confined space entries, and can an Attendant/Hole Watch monitor more than one entry at a time?

ANSWER: Good question! And, the answer is YES according to OSHA 1910.146. However, each space must be evaluated on its own merits with all regulations and requirements applying to each individual entry. Here we will provide some tips when considering one Attendant for multiple entries. This is also where preparing comprehensive rescue preplans becomes essential, and we'll start there.

Suggestions for Writing Rescue Preplans

1.  One of the first things is to identify and categorize the space as “permit-required” or “non-permit required.” You’ll need to carefully consider the possible hazards based on the information gathered.

2.  Once you’ve identified the hazards, you’ll want to consider what actions might be taken to eliminate or control the hazard to allow for a safe entry. OSHA 1910.146 defines "acceptable entry conditions" as the conditions that must exist in a permit space to allow entry and to ensure that employees involved with a permit-required confined space entry can safely enter into and work within the space.

3.  Next, you would need to consider the type of work that is going to take place inside the space. A very important question to ask... could the work create its own hazard? (An example would include hot work being performed inside the space.) Then, what about rescue capabilities and requirements? Next, you’ll need to determine whether the entry should be considered “Rescue Available” or “Rescue Stand-by?”

Roco uses the terms “Rescue Available” or “Rescue Stand-by” to better prepare for safe entry operations and in determining more specific rescue needs for that particular entry. Here’s the way we use these distinctions...Rescue Available would be your normal entry that is NOT considered an IDLH (Immediately Dangerous to Life and Health)entry. In this case, a 10-15 minute response time for a rescue team would generally be sufficient to satisfy OSHA regulations and is typical during turnarounds where multiple entries are taking place.

On the other hand, we use Rescue Stand-by when a more immediate need is anticipated, such as with a hazardous atmosphere or potentially hazardous atmosphere. For example, with an IDLH entry, it may require the team to be standing by just outside the space in order to reach the patient in a timely manner (i.e., how long can you live without air...3 to 4 minutes?)  Or, how quickly can the entrant be engulfed where there is a potential engulfment hazard?  OSHA 1910.134 requires a standby person or persons capable of immediate action with IDLH atmospheres. (See reference below.)

OSHA Reference Note to Paragraph (k)(1)(i): What will be considered timely will vary according to the specific hazards involved in each entry. For example, §1910.134, Respiratory Protection, requires that employers provide a standby person or persons capable of immediate action to rescue employee(s) wearing respiratory protection while in work areas defined as IDLH atmospheres.

Regarding multiple entries, this Rescue Stand-by status could certainly limit the number of entries that could take place due to the availability of qualified responders and equipment. You must also consider that if you’re doing an entry that requires Rescue Stand-by and are called to respond to a rescue from a Rescue Available space, the entrants at the Rescue Stand-by entry must be evacuated before the team can respond. And, if there is only one rescue team, all other entries must stop during a rescue, as the team is no longer available.
Can an Attendant cover more than one confined space entry at the same time?

According to OSHA (see below), attendants can cover multiple spaces as long as they meet the responsibilities and duties at each entry site. If the spaces are “Rescue Available” and are in close proximity, this may be possible. However, without seeing the spaces and if they are on different levels as you mentioned, it could be very difficult for an Attendant to meet all of the requirements OSHA defines for Attendants.

OSHA Notes regarding Attendants and Multiple Entries...
NOTE to 1910.146(d)(6): Attendants may be assigned to monitor more than one permit space provided the duties described in paragraph (i) of this section can be effectively performed for each permit space that is monitored. Likewise, attendants may be stationed at any location outside the permit space to be monitored as long as the duties described in paragraph (i) of this section can be effectively performed for each permit space that is monitored.

1910.146(d)(7) If multiple spaces are to be monitored by a single attendant, include in the permit program the means and procedures to enable the attendant to respond to an emergency affecting one or more of the permit spaces being monitored without distraction from the attendant's responsibilities under paragraph (i) of this section;

Once all these critical factors have been reviewed, you will need to consider the following when writing a rescue plan for an identical space:

    Internal configuration
    Elevation
    Portal Size

For hazards and LOTO procedures, you may be able to use the same rescue plan to cover those spaces. An example would be in doing ten (10) ground-level entries into 6-ft deep manholes, each with a 24” round, horizontal portal with a valve at the bottom. The rescue plan may be identical for all of these entries with the same description and hazards. However, on the rescue plan, you would need to allow for any unexpected hazards such as a possible change in atmosphere. This would be needed to be detected and properly handled by the responders at the time of the incident.

So, these are some of the basics you need to consider when writing a rescue preplan for confined spaces and for determining if (and when) an Attendant can effectively monitor multiple spaces.

If you have questions concerning these topics, please feel free to contact Roco at 800-647-7626.

Since 1999, Roco has had the opportunity to train and equip rescue teams in Kuwait. The first team that we trained was the Kuwait National Petroleum Corporation (KNPC) Fire Officers that were assigned to three refineries located south of Kuwait City.  In 2001, Ratqa Contracting was tasked with providing a Technical Rescue Team at the same refineries and Roco provided the Technician Level training for this new team.

The Ratqa Rescue Team is comprised of contracted Filipino’s with the oversight of a Kuwaiti Rescue Officer. Management is committed to making sure the team receives Rescue Technician recertification every two years from Roco.

Two of our instructors from New Mexico, Tim Robson and Rich Pohl, have been the predominant instructors for this 19 member team over the years.  Both agree that this is one of the most competent and dedicated rescue teams they have ever taught.

On a recent recertification trip, Rich and Tim were made aware of an event by Lead Rescue Officer/Coordinator Mohammed Al-Raqum and Fire Officer Khalid Al-Habri. Both officers wanted to recognize the efforts of the team for an exemplary response to an unfortunate event. Both Rich and Tim thought this would be the perfect forum to recognize this excellent Rescue Team.

In October 2011, the team was responsible for the removal of 4 victims that had succumbed to H2S in a PRCS that was 15-feet deep by 20-feet wide. The space was extremely congested and had over 15 different process lines. It included a 5-ft diameter by 20-ft high tank. The workers had originally entered the space to remove a skillet blind when there was an accidental release of H2S.  During the investigation, it was determined that KNPC policies and procedures had not been adhered to and the entry team did not have a permit nor did they perform atmospheric monitoring prior to entering the space.

The Ratqa Rescue Team on duty at the time of the incident was located approximately 10 minutes away at a neighboring refinery. Immediately, the Rescue Team Leader terminated their current standby operations and responded within 6 minutes to the scene by utilizing a “short cut” which minimized response time by 4 minutes.

Upon arrival, the Rescue Team did a scene size-up and then created a response plan with the Rescue Officer, which took approximately 3 minutes (atmospheric readings detected 120 ppm of H2S). Two vertical hauling systems were anchored, and Rescuer 1 donned an SCBA and made entry. Three victims were removed within 6 minutes via tied full-body harnesses and were found to be pulseless. Because of this, the Rescue Officer and Rescue Team Leader decided to convert to a “body recovery” mode for the 4th victim. Rescuer 1 was relieved and sent to rehabilitate. Rescuer 2 donned an SCBA and made entry into the space. Considerable time was needed to extricate the 4th victim due to numerous process lines that ranged in diameter from ½” to 4 inches. From initial dispatch to termination of recovery took 51 minutes. In addition, the outside temperature was 101 degrees Fahrenheit at the time.

Rescue Response Timeline:
Initial Dispatch to arrival on scene – 6 minutes
Scene Size-up / Hazard Recognition / Rescue Plan – 3 minutes
Rescuer 1 enters space and removes 3 victims – 6 minutes
Rescuer 1 exits space / Response-mode revised to Recovery mode– 21 minutes
Rescuer 2 enters and removes entrapped 4th victim – 15 minutes
Outside Temperature: 101-degrees F
Overall Time: 51 minutes

We commend the team for its rescue response capabilities and for dealing with this unfortunate incident in such a timely and professional manner. It has been our pleasure to work with these emergency responders over the years.

"The concept of LOTO is a great one and it works. As rescuers, we have to take the common industrial application and expand it to ensure that the rescue scene is safe and that we are controlling hazards at the point of contact with the victim or in a space where something has gone very wrong," says Dennis O'Connell, Chief Instructor and Director of Training for Roco Rescue.

Although commonly referred to as the “Lock-out/Tag-out” (LOTO) standard, the actual title of 1910.147 is “The Control of Hazardous Energy.” This title probably better describes it's true purpose -- and there's no doubt that the understanding of this concept has saved many lives and prevented countless injuries.

The LOTO standard “covers the servicing and maintenance of machines and equipment in which the energizing or start-up of the machines or equipment, or release of stored energy, could harm employees.” It establishes OSHA’s minimum performance requirements for the control of such hazardous energy [Ref: 1910.147(a)(1)(i)].

The general concept of LOTO is that energy sources affecting the area in which servicing or maintenance is occurring are identified and locked in the “Off” position, or in the case of mechanical hazards, linkages are disconnected for the duration of the work. Some type of lock or device is placed on the equipment by those performing the work.

However, we’ve found that if you ask different people to define LOTO, you will get a variety of answers. Not only will you get different definitions, you’ll also get varying information as to how and when LOTO is to be used and who is actually allowed to place locks or controls during the LOTO process. OSHA CFR 1910.147(b) has a very narrow and specific definition of who can perform lock-out or tag-out operations. That definition does not include rescuers; and, actually, there is good reason for that.

If you ask emergency responders about LOTO, you’ll generally find that their definition has been expanded well past the “control of hazardous energy” to cover most rescue operations. This expanded safety mindset serves to protect both the rescuer(s) and the victim(s) from additional harm following an incident. Rescuers usually define LOTO as “making the scene safe; or controlling and keeping machinery from moving or shifting during a rescue.”

Unlike standard LOTO, which is usually a systems’ approach, rescuers are generally trying to control the environment near an entrapped victim. As rescuers, we often act outside the parameters of a LOTO procedure that may already be in place. Because rescuers would best be defined under “affected employees” in a rescue where a LOTO procedure is in place, we need to understand what OSHA CFR 1910.147(b) says about “authorized employees” and “affected employees.”

Authorized employee. A person who locks out or tags out machines or equipment in order to perform servicing or maintenance on that machine or equipment. An affected employee becomes an authorized employee when that employee's duties include performing servicing or maintenance covered under this section.

Caveman translation: A person that the employer says has the systems or mechanical knowledge and authority to safely lockout/tagout a machine or space.

Affected employee. An employee whose job requires him/her to operate or use a machine or equipment on which servicing or maintenance is being performed under lock-out or tag-out, or whose job requires him/her to work in an area in which such servicing or maintenance is being performed.

Caveman translation: I have to work in an area where LOTO is in place.

A nice definition can be found in 54FR36665 in the promulgation of the Control of Hazardous Energy Standard...

“...an ‘affected employee’ is one who does not perform the servicing... but whose responsibilities are performed in an area in which the energy control procedure is implemented and servicing operations are performed under that procedure. The affected employee does not need to know how to perform lock-out or tag-out, nor does that employee need to be trained in the detailed implementation of the energy control procedure. Rather, the affected employee need only be able to recognize when the energy control procedure is being implemented, to identify the locks or tags being used, and to understand the purpose of the procedure and the importance of not attempting to start up or use the equipment, which has been locked out or tagged out.”

There is good reason for these prohibitions. Improperly performed LOTO can be just as dangerous, if not more so, than no LOTO at all. Allowing LOTO to be performed by personnel who are not familiar with the processes and equipment to be locked out increases the chances of improper lock-out. The requirement that only employees actually performing the servicing and maintenance of equipment are allowed to lock out equipment is less of a concern for rescuers than may first appear – and here’s why.

Typically, the person being rescued from a space that has hazardous energy sources is someone who has already performed LOTO. If that person performed LOTO properly and the reason for the rescue is something other than exposure to a hazardous energy source, the rescuers are not exposed because the victim obviously cannot remove his lock while he is being rescued. If the victim performed the LOTO improperly and the rescuers discover the error, the rescuers can then lock-out the equipment as they see fit or as the rescue needs dictate without violating the standard because they are not locking out the equipment as part of the LOTO program. They are locking the equipment out as part of making the area safe for rescue operations.

The Consequences: Worker's Amputation in Turkey Shackle Leads to $318,000 Proposed Fine

OSHA initiated an inspection after the July 20, 2011, incident, in which the employee’s arm allegedly became caught in an energized turkey shackle line while the employee was working alone in a confined space.

 Jan 24, 2012 - OSHA cited the company for 11 safety violations at its Wisconsin facility after a worker’s arm was amputated below the shoulder while the individual was conducting cleaning activities in a confined space. Proposed fines total $318,000. “The company has a legal responsibility to follow established permit-required confined space regulations to ensure that its employees are properly protected from known workplace hazards,” said Mark Hysell, director of OSHA’s Eau Claire Area Office.

  “Failing to ensure protection through appropriate training and adherence to OSHA regulations led to a worker losing an arm.”

OSHA initiated an inspection after the July 20, 2011, incident, in which the employee’s arm allegedly became caught in an energized turkey shackle line while the employee was working alone in a confined space. Afterward, the employee had to walk down a flight of 25 stairs and 200 feet across the production floor to get the attention of a co-worker for assistance.

Four willful violations involve not following OSHA’s permit-required confined space regulations in the carbon dioxide tunnel room, including failing to ensure that workers isolated the carbon dioxide gas supply line and locked out power to the shackle line prior to entering the room to conduct cleaning activities, verify that electro-mechanical and atmospheric hazards within the room were eliminated prior to workers entering the space, test atmospheric conditions prior to allowing entry, and provide an attendant during entries to the room.

Seven serious violations involve failing to provide fall protection, provide rescue and emergency services equipment, develop procedures to summon rescue and emergency

services, provide confined space entry procedures, prepare entry permits for the confined space, train employees and supervisors in entry permit procedures, and ensure that the entry supervisor performed required duties. This spells T-R-O-U-B-L-E.

Another Six-Figure OSHA Fine for LOTO Death

 Dec 14, 2011 - OSHA announced it has cited a Missouri recycling facility for 37 safety and health violations following an inspection opened after a worker died from injuries sustained June 12 when he entered a baling machine to clear a jam and the machine became energized. Proposed fines total $195,930.

 Twenty-two serious safety violations have been filed, including failing to lock out and tag out the energy sources of equipment and install adequate machine guarding; fall protection; exits; flammable liquids; fire extinguishers; powered industrial trucks; and welding and electrical equipment. Eight serious health violations were cited, as was a one repeat safety violation relating to defective powered industrial trucks that were not taken out of service. The company was cited in April 2010 for a similar violation, according to OSHA.

As rescuers we need to be aware that the LOTO standard applies to general industry operations and DOES NOT apply to the following:

•     Construction;
•     Agriculture;
•     Shipyards;
•     Marine Terminals;
•     Long shoring;
•     Installations under the exclusive control of electric utilities for the purpose of power generation, transmission and distribution, including related equipment for communication or metering;
•     Oil and gas well drilling and servicing;
•     Exposure to electrical hazards from work on, near, or with conductors or equipment in electric-utilization installations, which is covered by subpart S of the general industry standards;
•     Hot tap operations;
•     Continuity of service is essential;
•     Shutdown of system is impractical.

For some of the above operations, applicable regulations provide for procedures specific to the industry which, if followed, should provide proven effective protection for employees. However, rescuers need to be aware that activities in these areas not covered by OSHA’s LOTO standard could have uncontrolled energy sources. As we often say, “if everything had been done properly, we probably wouldn’t be responding as rescuers.”

In accordance with OSHA regulations, a LOTO program is a documented plan for safe work practices when dealing with energy sources. Prior to work commencing, potential sources of hazardous energy must be identified and controlled. Under certain circumstances where energy sources cannot be “locked out,” warning tags may be used. As responders, we do not have the luxury of studying blueprints and schematics to identify how to isolate the hazard. In fact, we’re most often responding to incidents that had a LOTO system in place that turned out to be ineffective or improperly used.

Rescue Scenario Examples

Rescuers were called to an incident in which a worker was trapped inside a confined space (a taffy mixing machine) that was supposed to be locked out. The machine suddenly activated; however, and the worker was seriously injured by the mixing blades. Employees on scene who initially locked out the equipment could not figure out where they erred – and they didn’t know how to prevent it from reoccurring as rescuers prepared to enter the space.

Not wanting to become victims themselves, the rescuers quickly considered several options to make the vessel safe for entry. They considered tying the blades so they couldn’t move, or wedging the blades against the side walls of the vessel, or disconnecting the motor. Because the patient was bleeding profusely, time was critical and all of these options would have taken too long. The rescuers ultimately opted to kill the power to the entire building, making the space safe for rescuers to enter. Fortunately, it was an option in this case. It may not have been an option where doing so would require shutting down an entire operating unit in a refinery or other industrial facility.

Another Incident during a Roco CSRT Stand-by

Another case of LOTO “gone bad” occurred during a Roco CSRT stand-by job at a local industrial plant. After LOTO had supposedly been performed, one of our team members happened to push the “Start” button as a test on a hyper bar in a tank – it turned “On!” Further investigation revealed that electrical work had been done in the area and the fuse lock-out was moved to another box adjacent to its original location. No one had notified the workers or changed the written protocol. Workers were locking out the wrong circuit! Had this been a rescue, how would rescuers control the hazard without knowing where the problem was with the LOTO?

Often overlooked, but another huge consideration for rescuers, is stored energy. OSHA identifies these hazards and provides a pretty good list of examples to be aware of when responding. It includes stored or residual energy in capacitors, springs, elevated machine members, rotating flywheels, hydraulic systems, and air, gas, steam, or water pressure, etc. Rescuers need equipment and techniques to control, restrain, dissipate, and immobilize these hazards. We also need the skills to manually isolate the area where the victim is located.

For general work operations, referring to LOTO as the placing of locks or tags or the removal of key controls may be sufficient. However, for rescuers, this alone may not provide adequate protection if those controls do not work or were never used.

From a rescuer’s viewpoint, our definition and options for effective LOTO needs to include other equipment and techniques that provide a safe area for rescue operations and to prevent further harm to the victim. This includes equipment that is used every day in the municipal rescue world that may not typically be found in an industrial facility. This includes equipment such as hydraulic spreaders and high pressure air bags. Even simple tools, such as metal wedges, can be used to isolate and protect the hand or arm of a victim trapped in a piece of machinery. The key is to determine your current capabilities and to identify what you may need prior to an incident occurring.

Municipal and industrial rescuers get called to a wide variety of rescues – each with its own unique problems and solutions. As we all know, the number of ways people can get themselves in harm’s way is unlimited! In all entrapment incidents, however, it is essential that we protect both the victim and ourselves from further injury and limit our exposure to the hazards that are present. In every incident, rescuers must first identify the hazards and try to eliminate or control them in every way possible.

Many times, as rescuers, we find ourselves using rudimentary “lock out” techniques. For example, when responding to stuck, occupied elevators in New York, we would access the control room, pull the power disconnect and use our handcuffs to lock it in the disconnect position. This was to prevent someone from turning the power back on while we were working in the shaft to free the victims from the elevator.

On more serious elevator rescues where the cables were slack, additional lock-out was achieved by using rated rescue rope/chains or cables to secure the elevator car so that it could not move up or down. Even during auto extrications, we would disconnect the battery to reduce the chances of an airbag deploying as well as not positioning ourselves between a rigid surface and an airbag.

Machine entrapment rescues are another all too common situation in which responders need to isolate the area at the point of contact with the patient to prevent further movement. In some cases, we have used wood or metal wedges to prevent further crushing, or chains, hydraulic tools, or cables to lock the machinery in place. And, rescuers beware... sometimes what sounds like a simple solution – such as turning off a machine – can do more harm if the machine normally recycles before coming to a resting position.

In Conclusion

From these examples, you can see that rescuers need to look deeper into their toolbox of techniques for creative options to isolate energy sources in order to protect themselves as well as the victim. And, this doesn’t just apply to municipal rescuers either. Industrial rescue teams are very likely to be called when an emergency like this occurs within your facility. In order to be proactive and prepared, take the time in advance to evaluate your response capabilities as well as that of local responders in your immediate area. Every minute is critical for that person trapped or injured.